Updates from the Threat Analysis Group (TAG)

TAG Bulletin: Q2 2020

This bulletin includes the coordinated influence campaigns that were terminated on our platforms in the second quarter of 2020. It was updated on August 5, 2020.

April

We terminated 16 YouTube channels, one Ad account, and one AdSense account as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. The campaign was associated with the Iranian state-funded International Virtual Media Union (IUVM) network and published content in Arabic related to the U.S. response to COVID-19 and content about Saudi-American relations. We received information from FireEye and Graphika that supported us in this investigation.

We terminated 15 YouTube channels and 3 blogs as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign published content in both English and Russian about the European Union, Lithuania, Ukraine, and the United States, similar to the findings presented in Graphika’s recent report titled Secondary Infektion. We received information from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.

We terminated 7 YouTube channels as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign published content in Russian, German, and Persian about Russian and Syrian politics and the U.S. response to COVID-19. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

We terminated 186 YouTube channels as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels primarily uploaded non-political and undesirable content, but a small group published political content mainly in Chinese, similar to the findings presented in the recent Graphika report, including content related to the U.S. response to COVID-19.

We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. The campaign published content in both Bosnian and Arabic criticizing the U.S. and the Iranian People’s Mojahedin Organization (PMOI). This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

May

We terminated 1,098 YouTube channels as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels primarily uploaded non-political and undesirable content, but a small group published political content mainly in Chinese, similar to the findings presented in the recent Graphika report, including content related to the U.S. response to COVID-19. We received information from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.

We terminated 47 YouTube channels and one AdSense account as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign published coordinated content in Russian about domestic Russian politics and international relations. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

June

We terminated 1,312 YouTube channels as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels primarily uploaded non-political and undesirable content, but a small group published political content mainly in Chinese, similar to the findings presented in the recent Graphika report, including content related to the protests regarding racial justice in the United States. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.

We terminated 17 YouTube channels as part of the ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign published coordinated comments in Russian under a small set of Russian-language videos. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.

We blocked 3 developers on Play and terminated one Ad account as part of our actions against coordinated influence operations. The campaign was distributing news content in both English and French, targeting audiences in Africa. We found evidence that this campaign was linked to the Tunis-based public relations firm Ureputation. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

Source:

https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2020/